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TIME: Almanac 1990
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1990 Time Magazine Compact Almanac, The (1991)(Time).iso
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time
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050189
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05018900.023
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1990-09-17
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WORLD, Page 47America AbroadThe Killing Fields RevisitedBy Strobe Talbott
The Bush Administration inherited a policy toward Kampuchea
that increased the chances of a return to power by the Khmer Rouge,
who killed nearly 2 million of their countrymen between 1975 and
1979. Now, with the Vietnamese preparing to pull out of that
tortured country and the U.S. pondering whether to send new
American arms to guerrillas in the countryside, the Administration
could end up compounding both the danger for Kampuchea and the
disgrace for the U.S.
Under Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter, the U.S. gave priority
to evicting the Vietnamese troops, who invaded Kampuchea a decade
ago. But to that end, Washington backed an unholy alliance of
resistance forces, linking two non-Communist groups with the Khmer
Rouge. Those genocidal ultra-Maoists are the best organized and
best armed of the guerrillas, not to mention the most ruthless. So
there has always been the possibility that they would come out on
top after the Vietnamese withdrew.
On April 5, Viet Nam finally announced that it would pull its
troops out of Kampuchea by the end of September, leaving behind a
pro-Hanoi regime. The decision presented the Bush Administration
with a chance to turn, unambiguously, to preventing the Khmer Rouge
from moving into power. Instead, the Administration is now giving
priority to bringing down the Communist regime that the Vietnamese
installed in Phnom Penh -- though that regime seems to be
rebuilding the country.
The Administration repeatedly, and no doubt sincerely, says it
does not want the Khmer Rouge to "dominate" a new Kampuchea. But
it endorses the idea of a four-part coalition government that would
embrace and thereby, it is hoped, co-opt the Khmer Rouge. Speaking
of the prospective coalition, Secretary of State James Baker told
the Senate last month, "You're going to have the Khmer Rouge there
. . . That's a fact of life." That is true only if the U.S. and the
Khmer Rouge's principal patrons, China and Thailand, make it so.
What is, alas, all but inevitable is more civil war after the
Vietnamese pull out. With their record, the Khmer Rouge can hardly
be expected to submit to elections or to participate in a peaceful
democracy. If they and the non-Communists remain aligned against
the Phnom Penh leaders, the three-against-one combination will
probably end in the defeat of the odd faction out; that will allow
the Khmer Rouge to turn their guns on the other two.
President Bush could make the nightmare all the more likely if
he decides -- as some of his aides and key Congressmen are urging
-- to start sending U.S. arms to the non-Communist resistance
forces. Under present circumstances, and under current U.S. policy,
that "lethal assistance" would be directed against Phnom Penh, not
the Khmer Rouge.
Despite Baker's apparent fatalism, the U.S. does have another
choice. It could back a three-part coalition that includes the two
non-Communist factions and the leaders in Phnom Penh but forcefully
excludes the Khmer Rouge. Not unless and until the two
non-Communist groups accept that realignment should Washington
provide them with arms. The result would be a different
three-against-one equation that might lead to the eventual
disintegration of the Khmer Rouge. And that would be a far happier
fact of life for Kampuchea -- as well as a consequence for U.S.
policy of which Americans could, for a change, be proud.